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Abstract: The famous “ratio of fire” 
data proposed by S.L.A. Marshall 
claims that no more than 15-20 
percent of soldiers fired their 
weapons in combat. This article 
examines whether or not historians 
can treat Marshall’s ratio of fire 
data as veracious, and if so what 
interpretations one can assign to 
the phenomenon of combat non-
participation. The article contends 
that based upon the Canadian 
experience it  is  premature to 
universalize Marshall’s findings 
beyond his specif ic historical 
subjects, and that studies of human 
behaviour in war need to look beyond 
the ratio of fire data as a paradigm for 
understanding the conduct of soldiers 
in battle.
In April of 2011 readers of the Winnipeg Free Press may have 
been surprised to learn that most 
American soldiers in the Second 
World War would not fight or kill in 
battle. A column by Gwynne Dyer, 
one of Canada’s best-known military 
writers, likely gave many lay-readers 
their first exposure to what is actually 
a very old idea, that soldiers would 
not participate in battle.1 Although 
the article is about post-traumatic 
stress disorder, it refers to the famous 
observations of American military 
icon Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall 
on the widespread non-participation 
of infantrymen in battle, which he 
supposedly observed during the 
Second World War. Dyer’s opinion 
piece is the latest in a large body of 
scholarship that treats Marshall’s 
work as authoritative and ensures 
its prominent place in discussions 
on the  human dimensions of 
warfare. However, Marshall’s work 
has also been severely criticized. 
This article joins the debate by 
introducing new historical evidence 
and reconceptualising some of the 
assumptions surrounding human 
behaviour in warfare.
 S.L.A. Marshall needs little 
introduction to a military audience. 
Best-remembered for the work he 
did with the US Army’s Historical 
Section during the Second World 
War, he was a military writer who 
helped shape the mid-20th century 
American fighting forces and the 
writing of their history. Although 
he authored many major works, 
Marshall’s modern pre-eminence 
rests upon just one: the “modern 
classic” Men Against Fire (1947) and 
the extraordinary claims it made 
about the propensity of infantrymen 
not to do any actual fighting in 
battle. Marshall’s core thesis was 
that only 15 to 20 percent of combat 
infantrymen ever fired their weapons 
in battle; he was the first to document 
that most riflemen were spectators. 
Marshall extrapolated his findings 
into a universal law of human 
behaviour in warfare, claiming that 
the disinclination of most soldiers 
to fight was actually ubiquitous 
throughout history, underreported 
only because “in earlier wars there 
had never existed the opportunity 
for systematic collection of data.”2
 This data on non-firing and non-
fighting soldiers, for which Marshall 
coined the term “ratio of fire,” became 
extremely popular, and some — 
including Dyer — have credited 
him with revolutionizing postwar 
infantry training through his studies.3 
However, since the 1980s more critical 
scholarship has called attention 
to Marshall’s desultory, some say 
nonexistent, evidence, his propensity 
for exaggeration, the testimony of 
witnesses claiming Marshall never 
systematically collected data, and 
his personal character.4 Marshall’s 
academic supporters have in turn 
defended him, attempting to prove 
the accuracy of Men Against Fire’s 
claims, often by citing the numerous 
and very important individuals who 
believed what he wrote.5 At times the 
debate has descended to the level of 
muck-raking and in some quarters 
has taken on the characteristics of a 
personal feud.6
 Unfortunately, this academic 
quarrel  has  strayed from the 
evidence; not just whether there 
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is evidence to buttress Marshall’s 
extraordinary claims, but what 
that evidence actually means. Men 
Against Fire succeeded in shaping 
the assumptions of this debate, and 
these assumptions have rarely been 
questioned. For instance: what does 
it really mean when soldiers are not 
firing their weapons in battle? Is this 
non-firing unconscious — cowardice, 
combat fatigue, a genetic instinct to do 
no harm to others? Or is it deliberate 
— malingering, tactical necessity, 
or (something rarely considered) a 
part of soldiers’ training? Are these 
meanings stable and static — are they 
roughly the same across the breadth 
of human experience — or are they 
unstable and historically specific? 
Can one place non-firing soldiers 
into different categories or does this 
phenomenon always indicate the 
same thing? These are all questions 
stemming from the presumption that 
Marshall’s ratio of fire argument is a 
truly accurate portrayal of combat; 
the issue is complicated further if one 
accepts the critics’ challenge to treat 
Marshall’s evidence as compromised 
and untrustworthy.
 This article is part of a wider effort 
to explore the validity of Marshall’s 
ratio of fire data, and to further the 
debate further by grounding it in 
the historical evidence. It explores 
the meaning of fire ratios rather 
than simply arguing about whether 
Marshall’s specific claims are correct 
or not, and will hopefully add depth 
to the questions posed above. This 
discussion will be based heavily upon 
Canadian military archival records 
detailing land warfare in the Second 
World War, the basis of my own 
research. Marshall studied American 
soldiers, but the Canadian and US 
armies fought in the same theatres 
of war against the same enemy with 
similar equipment from 1943 to 1945. 
The Canadian Army provides a test 
for the validity of Marshall’s claims 
to the universality of his ratio of fire 
theory; there are good Canadian 
sources that speak to this issue.
 Why is this important? The 
ratio of fire numbers remain in 
popular circulation today, forming 
the empirical evidence for the 
“killology” scholarship spearheaded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) Dave 
Grossman. This sustained influence 
is in large part because it has been 
difficult to prove or disprove the ratio 
of fire with documentary historical 
evidence. Meanwhile, Marshall’s 
defenders have argued that raising 
these issues is tantamount to attacking, 
for the sake of academic snobbery, an 
old soldier who cannot fight back.7 But 
this impassioned defence misses the 
point of scholarly inquiry altogether. 
Marshall’s ratio of fire, and the 
singular interpretation derived from 
it, has had a considerable effect on 
the scholarship and has influenced 
military policy. This alone is good 
reason to explore and test some 
of these assumptions. The recent 
criticisms that have shown Marshall’s 
work as potentially untrustworthy 
add a further imperative to this task.
If Marshall Was Right: 
Interpreting Non-Firing
Marshall’s interpretation of his own evidence begs definition. 
Marshall argued the low ratio of fire 
he observed in combat was due to 
an inborn “fear of aggression” he 
believed to be “part of the normal 
man’s emotion make-up.” He 
wrote in Men Against Fire that the 
average, healthy individual, even 
one who can endure the stresses 
of combat, “still has such an inner 
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and usually unrealized resistance 
toward killing a fellow man that he 
will not of his own volition take life 
if it is possible to turn away from that 
responsibility.”8 Marshall postulated 
from his observations on the Second 
World War a revolutionary idea that 
he considered applicable to the entire 
history of human warfare. Soldiers 
were not firing because of an innate 
resistance to killing others.
 Marshall’s interpretation can be 
summarized as follows: that soldiers 
not using their weapons is a) a bad 
thing, and b) represents a failure on 
the part of the military training system 
and the soldiers’ personal motivation 
to overcome an assumed human 
internal resistance to inflicting harm 
on others. Men Against Fire stated 
that infantrymen were unable to use 
their weapons because of a conscious 
or unconscious unwillingness to act 
aggressively, to threaten, or to kill 
others — even enemies attempting 
to kill them. Only those soldiers 
on crew-served weapons such as 
machine guns would reliably fight all 
the time; individual riflemen would 
not. The subsequent popularity of 
this interpretation is quite easy to 
understand. It flatters humanists 
because it affirms that most people 
are inherently good and would 
(could?) never hurt another person, 
even a stranger or an enemy. It 
simultaneously flatters those who do 
fight and kill, affirming that they are 
part of an elite group of warriors who 
are either culturally or biologically 
superior in this way to the rest of 
the humanity, who are the “sheep” 
waiting to be rescued, protected, and 
turned into collateral casualties. This 
argument has been enthusiastically 
expanded by Grossman in recent 
years, who claims that through 
proper training and conditioning 
techniques the number of shooting 
soldiers in combat can be raised to 
virtually 100 percent, but without 
Soldiers of the US 2nd Infantry Division advance into Brest, France under German machine gun fire, 9 September 1944.
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these techniques only a bare handful 
of soldiers will act in an aggressive 
manner or in self-defence.9
 As an intellectual exercise, let 
us ignore Marshall’s critics for a 
moment and take as a given that 
his evidence is accurate: that in 
the Pacific and European Theaters 
of Operations no more than 15 to 
20 percent of riflemen would ever 
take an active role in combat. Still, 
Marshall’s interpretation of the 
data is not self-evident. During his 
work with the army’s G-2 Historical 
Sect ion,  Marshall  carried out 
hundreds of after-action interviews 
with American rifle companies, 
using a group-interview process to 
reconstruct the action. He claimed to 
have interviewed over 600 different 
companies, though as Roger Spiller 
pointed out, going by Marshall’s own 
estimation of the time needed to carry 
out a group interview that number 
was impossibly high and would have 
had him interviewing rifle companies 
well into the postwar years, which he 
did not.10 He certainly did not have 
time to carry out follow-up interviews 
with the same soldiers, and could not 
have performed multiple interviews 
with many companies. So what we 
really have from Marshall is a set 
of data examining how thousands 
of soldiers fought, in one action 
apiece. If he made inquiries about 
weapon usage to find out who did 
and did not fire their weapons in a 
given action, then he would have 
found out who used their weapons 
in that one combat action. Even the 
most generous commentator must 
admit that there is no way to use 
that data to forecast whether the 
same soldiers would fire or not in 
future actions, or if they had behaved 
similarly in past instances. All that 
Marshall’s data does, assuming it 
exists and is accurate, is establish 
that in any given action, most soldiers 
would not use their weapons. But 
without follow-up interviews with 
the same rifle companies in which 
individual soldiers’ behaviour in 
subsequent combat was mapped 
against the behaviour noted during 
the initial interview, Marshall had 
no way of knowing if the ratio of 
fire was accounted for by the same 
soldiers not firing every time, or if 
it was a steady group average with 
different riflemen firing in each 
instance. Because detailed follow-up 
interviews were unlikely (Marshall’s 
historical reporting responsibilities 
took him where the main action was, 
and he rarely spent more than a few 
days with a company), Marshall’s 
“resistance to killing” theory is not 
self-evident from his data.
 The inherent inability of human 
beings to kill posited by Marshall 
becomes only one of several plausible 
scenarios that can be read into this 
data. A partial list might take into 
consideration the following without 
exhausting the possibilities: soldiers 
did not fire because they were afraid; 
A US Army anti-tank platoon searches for the position of a German machine 
gun that had fired on their vehicle, the Netherlands, 4 November 1944.
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because they were passively resisting; 
because they were suffering from 
combat stress reactions, so-called 
“battle exhaustion”; because they 
did not want to provoke enemy 
retaliation; because of a “live and let 
live” mentality; because the tactical 
situation or the terrain did not call 
for or allow effective small arms fire; 
because they had been trained to 
exercise strict fire discipline; because 
they had been ordered not to fire. 
Other possibilities exist. One can 
place these interpretations into two 
rough categories:
 
Deliberate Non-Firing Involuntary Non-Firing
Malingering / passive resistance
“Live and Let Live”
No opportunity to fire
Fire discipline
Resistance to killing
Fear reactions
Battle exhaustion
The notion of an inborn resistance 
to killing is extremely difficult to 
prove and relies upon indirect and 
usually ambiguous evidence. 11 
Conversely ,  there  is  credible 
documentary historical evidence 
supporting all of the other reasons 
for not firing charted above. There 
is no space, unfortunately, to go 
over each interpretation in detail, 
though they are all familiar topics 
in military studies. In Canada 
excellent work has been published 
on battle exhaustion, fear reactions, 
and military malingering and 
insubordination.12 All of them 
present potential explanations for 
why soldiers might elect not to 
fire, or might have no choice in the 
matter. The development of “live 
and let live” systems in combat and 
the meanings behind them is more 
controversial. The phenomenon is 
certainly documented, and informal 
cease-fires on quiet areas of a front 
had as much to do with not wanting 
to die for no reason as they did with 
not wanting to kill, and could be a 
rational response to the challenge 
of surviving in combat completely 
divorced from notions of a resistance 
to killing.13 There have also been 
excellent studies showing that on 
the ghostly, dispersed battlefields 
of the Second World War, it could 
sometimes be difficult to locate a 
target to engage at all, and soldiers 
trained to fire on a living, breathing 
Canadian soldiers occupy slit trenches shortly after the D-Day landings.
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target  might  rare ly  have the 
opportunity to do so.14
 One subject that is seldom treated 
in relation to Marshall’s work is fire 
discipline, the deliberate withholding 
of fire in a combat situation. This is 
unfortunate, as fire discipline has 
impressive explanatory power for 
non-firing during the Second World 
War. It is worth going into in some 
detail.
 In the Canadian Army between 
1939 and 1945 the tactical ideal being 
taught and trained for was controlled 
and highly-disciplined infantry 
small arms fire, not the saturation 
of the battlefield with fire (though it 
should be mentioned that the latter 
often happened anyway in battle). 
Doctrine and training manuals from 
before, during, and after the war 
stressed that fire should be held 
until it could be brought to bear 
with maximum effectiveness, and in 
places these publications discouraged 
riflemen from firing.15 A Canadian 
Officer Training Corps instructors’ 
manual from 1944 explained that, 
“To produce one casualty in the last 
war some statistician has figured 
out that it cost 75,000 rounds of 
small arms ammunition. This was 
in static warfare when the troops 
were stationary. What will it require 
in this mobile warfare when speed 
varies from 15 to 40 miles per hour? 
Accuracy is doubly important, 
Volume of Fire is not.”16 A I Canadian 
Corps training letter from Lieutenant-
General H.D.G. Crerar in March 1943 
articulated the point further, quoting 
officers returned from combat in 
North Africa: 
everyone I’ve spoken to on the 
subject agrees that we always open 
fire too soon which has no effect 
except to give away one’s position…
an early waste, and a subsequent 
shortage at a later critical moment, 
of precious ammunition, is typical 
of inadequately trained troops, the 
first time in action. The results can 
be disastrous.17
Training for fire discipline, as it was 
carried out in the Canadian military, 
A rifleman in the Regina Rifles mans a firing position in Cardonville 
Farm near Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, Normandy, 8-10 June 1944.
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seems to have been conditioned by 
the fact that inexperienced soldiers 
could blaze away too freely with 
their weapons, firing when panicky 
and nervous rather than making 
intelligent and controlled use of 
their small arms. The Canadian Army 
Training Memoranda issued during the 
Second World War frequently had 
disparaging remarks on the tendency 
of troops to fire too soon and too 
much, and in a May 1944 article tried 
to invoke the feelings of battle:
You are trained to shoot straight, you 
have plenty of ammunition to hand 
back for the killing of your chaps; 
but make sure of it – wait – wait and 
again wait even if you are frantically 
excited – WAIT!18
With training and experience there 
ideally came the tendency to fire less 
and more accurately, rather than 
more. Marshall would have seen 
this as a problem, but these ideas 
underwrote the training of Canadian 
infantrymen for battle.
 Canadian accounts from the 
fighting in the Second World War, in 
the form of detailed after-action battle 
experience questionnaires and war 
diary extracts compiled by Canada’s 
own Army Historical  Section, 
frequently discuss how fire discipline 
was being achieved and employed 
or to bemoan its absence. When 
comment on the volume of small 
arms fire was made in the infantry 
questionnaires it was typically to 
criticize too much undisciplined 
fire; no mention was ever made of 
insufficient shooting or infantry 
non-participation.19 Historical Section 
extracts from Canadian regimental 
war diaries, circulated during the 
fighting as “lessons learned” briefs, 
reveal similar attitudes towards fire 
discipline. Soldiers were urged to 
maintain the forward momentum 
of an attack by holding their fire 
and bypassing pockets of the enemy 
rather than stopping to exchange fire 
with them.20 Other reports observed 
despairingly that this was not always 
being carried out, and that recklessly 
large amounts of small arms fire 
was standard procedure in some 
infantry units.21 A balance always 
had to be struck. The enemy seldom 
revealed his presence, and firing 
at possible positions could inflict 
casualties or, more likely and just as 
useful, compel him to keep his head 
down and thus be incapable of firing 
back. Yet this also risked betraying 
one’s own position. As Roger Spiller 
pointed out in his original critique 
of Marshall, revealing your location 
to a battle-hardened enemy could 
mean death, and the production of 
too much small arms fire was the 
surest way to broadcast your precise 
whereabouts.22 
 Platoon and company leaders had 
different reactions to official policies 
of fire discipline. Many favoured 
tightly-controlled infantry fire, while 
others had no problem with their 
men scavenging extra automatic 
weapons from wrecked carriers to 
supplement the amount of fire they 
could produce.23 Widespread trigger-
happiness and excessive firing among 
the other ranks was often cited as a 
concern in contemporary analyses, 
but how serious a “problem” this 
was is uncertain because Canadian 
infantry fire tactics relied upon the 
ability of rifle sections to generate 
small arms fire in volume when 
needed.24 Generally speaking, for 
Canadians the problem was too 
much wasteful firing, not failures 
to fire. There is a high probability 
that many instances of non-firing 
may be attributable to deliberate 
tactical decisions, rather than being 
indications of non-participation or of 
an innate resistance to killing. Other 
instances of non-firing could well 
have been the result of a combination 
of factors, both deliberate and 
involuntary.
 T h e r e  i s  s o m e  l i m i t e d 
evidence independent of Marshall 
documenting infantry non-firing 
in battle and indicating it was 
considered a problem at some points 
in the Second World War. Most of 
these complaints seem almost entirely 
to originate from US Army reports.25 
A handful of postwar (and therefore 
potentially influenced by Marshall) 
Canadian accounts discuss infantry 
non-firing, but overall there is very 
little mention in Canadian sources of 
non-firing as a problem which raises 
questions about whether there was 
a difference between the Canadian 
and American experiences. Some of 
the American sources that mentioned 
non-firing as a problem also praise 
fire discipline or, as is more typical of 
Canadian reports, criticize excessive 
shooting.26 What can be taken from 
these apparent contradictions is that 
the violence of combat gives rise to 
confusion as few other experiences 
can. In all likelihood some soldiers 
did not fire their weapons or actively 
participate in every battle, but for a 
wide variety of reasons well beyond 
the scope of a simplistic cultural or 
biological “resistance to killing” that 
determined who would or would 
not fire. Even if S.L.A. Marshall was 
entirely correct in his observations, 
his interpretation of his own data is 
weak and replete with difficulties.
If Marshall Was Wrong: 
Assessing the Source
The case for Marshall’s work is further compromised when one 
abandons the assumption that his 
ratio of fire data represent trustworthy 
evidence. There is little evidence 
to support the claims made in Men 
Against Fire about infantry non-firing 
being a universal phenomenon. 
Contemporary Canadian evidence 
of weapons’ usage on the battlefield 
does not correlate with how Marshall 
claimed soldiers behaved in battle. 
There are also troubling questions 
about Marshall’s reliability as a 
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scholarly source. A real possibility 
exists that the famous ratio of fire 
numbers were fabricated on the 
basis of Marshall’s preconceptions 
of combat. 
 For all his fine historical work – 
and there was much of it – Marshall 
was a man who suffered from a 
scholarly myopia, and saw precisely 
what he wanted to see. In his memoirs 
Marshall described how during his 
very first assignment as a combat 
historian, at the US amphibious 
assault on Makin Island in 1943, he 
witnessed not the “universal” low 
firing ratio he later championed, but 
green US Marines with jittery nerves 
hitting the beach and blazing away 
with their weapons at anything that 
moved and many things that did not. 
It was the opposite of the ratio of fire: 
frightened soldiers employing too 
much fire to help calm themselves 
and assert power over their situation. 
Most importantly, Marshall wrote 
that he decided not to report on this 
at the time, because at that point he 
believed it was low firing ratios that 
were the most serious problem of 
modern infantry warfare.27 Marshall 
wilfully disregarded important 
evidence because he had already 
made up his mind that non-firing was 
the “real” problem – at his very first 
deployment as a combat observer! He 
allowed his preconceptions to govern 
his findings. According to those who 
knew him, this was not unusual for 
Marshall. Colonel E.M. Parker, a 
fellow analyst during the Korean War, 
wrote that Marshall conducted his 
interviews and research in such a way 
as to support his tendentious ideas.28 
One of his aides during the Second 
World War, John Westover, made 
similar comments: “Marshall was an 
intuitive thinker. He did not gather 
evidence, weigh it ponderously, draw 
tentative hypotheses, then test them. 
If he did, it was not in an organized 
manner. Usually, from ‘out of the 
blue’ he stated a principle. Then he 
marshalled his evidence and statistics 
to back his concepts. Some of his 
statistics are subject to grave question 
as to source.”29 Another former aide 
was David Hackworth, who wrote 
in his controversial memoir that, 
“Veterans of many of the actions 
[Marshall] ‘documented’ in his books 
have complained bitterly over the 
years of his inaccuracy or blatant bias. 
It was a conscious effort on his part to 
give the audience the impression he 
was there…he didn’t seem to care that 
what he wrote was totally inaccurate 
and easily disproved. He seemed to 
have relied (and successfully so) on 
the notion that no one would ever 
dare to correct him.”30 Serious issues 
of academic credibility are at stake.
 The literature on infantry combat 
has also discussed the tendency 
of inexperienced soldiers to shoot 
wildly. The classic American study of 
The available evidence concerning the actions of Canadian infantry in battle does not fit 
with Marshall’s observations regarding US infantry.  Here, soldiers of the Fusiliers Mont-
Royal attack near Oldenburg, Germany supported by British Churchill tanks, 29 April 1945.
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social psychology in the Second World 
War, carried out by Samuel Stouffer 
and his team, surveyed American 
GIs to identify (among many other 
things) combat errors frequently 
made by inexperienced soldiers. 
“Shooting before they are able to 
see their targets” was perceived as 
an error far more prevalent among 
inexperienced replacements than 
others such as “freezing” or “not 
being aggressive enough in combat.” 
Stouffer commented: “Shooting 
before they are able to see their target, 
or being ‘trigger happy,’ is usually 
interpreted as a sign of improperly 
controlled anticipatory anxiety 
or nervousness, which of course 
was high among replacements.” 
The Stouffer study concluded that 
“seasoned combat men made all these 
errors much less frequently.”31 Other 
sources have likewise discussed how 
the tendency of “green” soldiers is 
to shoot to excess, and that training 
and experience are required to bring 
“trigger-happiness” under control.32 
Marshall observed this phenomenon 
firsthand on Makin Island, though 
he ignored it. It is possible that a 
reduction in a unit’s firing rates 
could be an indicator of discipline, 
experience, and good training, the 
opposite of Marshall’s conclusion 
that more fire was what won battles. 
This possibility certainly deserves 
further study.
 It is also interesting to note that 
studies were carried out during the 
Second World War which investigated 
infantry weapon usage in detail. The 
British Weapons Technical Staff Field 
Force (WTSFF) and its Canadian 
wing carried out methodical post-
combat reviews of infantry weapon 
use, misuse, and technical difficulties. 
The WTSFF staffs began their work 
with the British Eighth Army in 
North Africa in 1942, and conducted 
studies of infantry weapons in over 
100 rifle companies in North West 
Europe between June 1944 and May 
1945, interviewing commanding 
officers, junior officers, and private 
soldiers.33 In many ways the WTSFF 
teams carried out the kind of studies 
that S.L.A. Marshall took credit for. 
A report summarizing their findings 
in May 1945 wrote: 
From the Normandy beaches, 
through the hedge-rows and woods 
of the “Bocage” country, over the flat 
Dutch country-side, to the tree and 
hedge covered German plains, fields 
of view have been short. Defensive 
positions have been easily concealed 
and usually sited with short fields of 
fire. [Canadian] Units have sought 
to achieve surprise in defence by 
holding their fire until the enemy 
were near.34
The report  s tresses  the short 
ranges and limited fields of fire 
that Canadians had to deal with 
throughout  the  campaign  in 
Normandy and Northwest Europe, 
an environment in which survival 
meant not giving away your position 
by premature fire. The WTSFF 
commentary on individual weapons’ 
usage and capabilities were quite 
thorough: the Sten machine-carbine 
was heavily criticized as unreliable, 
whereas the standard-issue Lee-
Enfield No.4 Rifle was popular, 
having “performed well” throughout 
the campaigns.35 The WTSFF teams 
investigating British and Dominions’ 
weapons’ usage did not appear 
to have uncovered any indication 
of widespread non-participation 
in battle, and they were as well-
positioned as Marshall himself to 
have observed such a phenomenon.36 
While the absence of such comments 
is not positive evidence, it stands to 
reason that a military staff devoted to 
researching how infantrymen were 
or were not employing their small 
arms in battle would have discovered 
the “ratio of fire” problem Marshall 
wrote about had it been present and 
observable.
Conclusion: The Marshall 
Paradigm
Even if Marshall was entirely correct,  his arguments and 
interpretations present problems. 
Conflicting evidence makes it 
impossible to make a strong case 
that Marshall’s ratio of fire was 
based on fact, or that it was a 
unversal phenomenon rather than 
an historical phenomenon. That such 
errors were ever made is troubling, 
but moreso is the support that Men 
Against Fire enjoys in military and 
scholarly establishments. The ratio 
of fire continues to attract supporters 
despite two decades of criticism and 
compelling contrary evidence, and 
has undergone a recent renaissance 
and resurgence.
 The underlying problem with 
this body of work is that Marshall’s 
evidence on ratio of fire does not meet 
the criteria for trustworthy historical 
evidence. It is frequently reproduced 
and cited not because of its accuracy 
but because many important people 
believe in it. But compelling evidence 
shows that Marshall was factually 
incorrect in his assertions that only 
15-20 percent of riflemen fired their 
weapons in the Second World War. 
Even if he was wholly correct, his 
interpretation of the meaning of this 
phenomenon does not stand up well 
to scrutiny. The best case one can 
make for Marshall is that he might 
have discovered low volumes of 
fire in American rifle companies at 
certain times, but even this possibility 
represents the beginning of a scholarly 
discussion rather than a self-evident 
endpoint. If a low volume of fire 
was a significant phenomenon, what 
may have accounted for differences 
between the American and Canadian 
experience? Were the differences 
attributable to varied training 
schemes? To personal motivation 
and the conscript/volunteer divide? 
To cultural or institutional forces? 
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To perceptions of “correct” behavior 
in combat? These questions have not 
been answered, and to universalize 
Marshall’s findings beyond the 
specific subjects he studied is 
premature. New understandings of 
fire ratios and human behaviour in 
warfare will have to look beyond 
Marshall’s narrow paradigm.
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